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ABSTRACT
The dominant legal and regulatory approach to protecting information privacy is 
a form of mandated disclosure commonly known as “notice-and-consent.” Many 
have criticized this approach, arguing that privacy decisions are too complicated, 
and privacy disclosures too convoluted, for individuals to make meaningful con-
sent decisions about privacy choices—decisions that often require us to waive 
important rights. While I agree with these criticisms, I argue that they only mean-
ingfully call into question the “consent” part of notice-and-consent, and that they 
say little about the value of notice. We ought to decouple notice from consent, 
and imagine notice serving other normative ends besides readying people to make 
informed consent decisions.
Keywords: information privacy, notice, consent, mandated disclosure, autonomy 
The dominant legal and regulatory approach to protecting information 
privacy is a form of mandated disclosure commonly known as “notice-
and-choice” or “notice-and-consent.” Rather than directly regulating 
information practices, notice-and-consent simply requires that individuals 
be notified and grant their permission before information about them is 
collected and used. While there are a number of benefits to this approach—
it’s cheap, encourages innovation, and appeals to individual choice—it has 
come under sustained criticism. Philosophers and legal theorists argue that 
the cost of opting out of services is often too high to represent a mean-
ingful choice for individuals to make. In cases where they might reason-
ably opt out individuals are frequently ill-equipped to fully understand the 
decision they face. And even when they do understand it, what is at issue 
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in the decision is often a social rather than individual interest. In such cases 
individuals should not be deciding about it in the first place.
On account of these problems many of notice-and-consent’s critics call 
for a move to more substantive regulation. They do not advocate abandon-
ing notice-and-consent entirely, but urge us to recognize its limitations 
and count on it to do only as much work in upholding privacy norms as it 
is able. How much work that is exactly remains somewhat unclear, but we 
are left with the impression that it isn’t a lot.
These arguments are largely persuasive. I agree that the notice-and- 
consent approach is mostly ineffectual and that in order to protect people’s 
privacy, we need therefore to implement more substantive regulations. In 
this article, however, I argue that the earlier considerations successfully 
call into question only the “consent” part of notice-and-consent, and 
that there are independent reasons for valuing notice. This is import-
ant because  critics of notice-and-consent seem to assume that consent is 
the crucial component, that notice is valuable only because (in theory) it 
makes informed consent possible. Thus, having shown that consent fails 
to further the normative aims we look to it for—to make data practices 
deferential to individual preferences and interests—they assume to have 
undermined the case for notice too.
I argue that we shouldn’t throw the baby out with the bathwater. While 
critics of notice-and-consent are right that we ought to marginalize the 
role of individual consent in privacy regulation, that does not entail mar-
ginalizing the role of notice in equal proportion. To show that we ought 
to abandon the practice of mandated privacy disclosures, critics must eval-
uate notice on its own terms. While helping us decide whether or not to 
consent to specific data practices is one purpose notice could serve, it may 
also be valuable for other reasons. Indeed, the very arguments for moving 
away from consent-oriented regulatory approaches themselves counsel in 
favor of holding onto notice. If the problem with notice-and-consent as a 
whole is that it fails to facilitate and respect individual agency over data, 
then we ought not to deprive ourselves of even flawed and partial mecha-
nisms for strengthening such agency. As I attempt to show, notice—shorn 
from consent procedures—can act as one such mechanism. This argument 
aligns with mounting demands by privacy advocates for increased trans-
parency around data-driven systems.1 Privacy disclosures are one of the few 
existing and established transparency tools we have.
 1. Pangburn.
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What’s more, calls to abandon the notice-and-consent model arrive at a 
particularly inopportune moment. First, because our technologies and the 
sociotechnical systems they are embedded in are increasing in complexity, 
it is likely increasingly difficult for the average person to understand them 
and the stakes of using them. Users need more information about the data 
practices they are implicated, not less, now more than ever.2 Second, the 
political climate—at least in the United States—bodes poorly for pass-
ing the kind of substantive privacy regulations notice-and-consent’s critics 
envision.3 It would be imprudent, at best, to sacrifice what tools we have 
for better tools we may never get.
With this in mind, I proceed as follows. In the first section, I review the 
arguments against notice-and-consent more closely, with an eye toward 
pinpointing the precise target of its critics’ normative worries. Having 
found that the target is consent (and not notice), I pull the two apart, 
and I discuss why we ought to evaluate notice on its own terms. Finally, 
I attempt to place notice on firmer normative ground by offering some 
suggestions for why we ought to value notice in a world that has moved 
past the notice-and-consent framework.
The Rise and Fall of Notice-and-Consent
Privacy regulation in the United States is guided by the “Fair Information 
Practice Principles” (FIPPs), a set of recommendations originally devel-
oped by the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) 
in 1973.4 Recognizing the threat to individual privacy posed by the gov-
ernment’s move toward computerized record-keeping, HEW Secretary 
Caspar Weinberger tasked a committee with articulating principles for 
safeguarding it. The committee defined privacy as “control by an individual 
 2. Of course, too much information can also be a problem. What is needed is information 
well-selected and well-presented. See Carr; and Andrejevic; and the section “Notice Unchained.”
 3. There is some reason for hope that this situation might be changing. Recently proposed 
federal legislation known as the “Data Care Act” would in fact guarantee some important sub-
stantive protections, and it demonstrates that many U.S. lawmakers are aware of these problems. 
However, the bill is not likely to pass. See Lecher. The situation is somewhat more promising at 
the state level. A number of states, including California, Vermont, and Colorado, have enacted 
state-level privacy protections, and a number of other states are considering following suit. 
However, most of these protections focus on strengthening existing consent-based frameworks 
rather than placing substantive limits on data practices. See Gilliland.
 4. Gellman.
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over the uses made of information about him,” and it designed the FIPPs 
to bolster that control.5 The report put forward five broad principles:
1. There must be no personal data record-keeping systems whose very 
existence is secret.
2. There must be a way for a person to find out what information about 
the person is in a record and how it is used.
3. There must be a way for a person to prevent information about the 
person that was obtained for one purpose from being used or made 
available for other purposes without the person’s consent.
4. There must be a way for a person to correct or amend a record of 
identifiable information about the person.
5. Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating records 
of identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of the data for 
their intended use and must take precautions to prevent misuses of the 
data.
Since 1973, the FIPPs have been further developed and refined, and 
they have been put into practice in a variety of different ways. The 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) used 
them as a model for developing European privacy guidelines in 1980.6 The 
OECD rules were superseded in 2018 by the EU General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR), which retains the previous framework’s emphasis 
on individual informed consent.7 In Europe, privacy rules govern both 
public and private sector data collection.8 In the United States, we have 
taken a more piecemeal approach. The Privacy Act of 1974 adopted the 
FIPPs directly, but applies only to information collected and stored by 
federal government agencies (5 U.S.C. § 552a). Other laws, like the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (FCRA), use versions of the FIPPs to regulate both public 
 5. U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. It is important to note that this 
understanding of privacy is not universally held. Philosophers, legal theorists, and privacy advo-
cates have argued for alternative definitions of privacy, such as privacy as limited access, privacy 
as secrecy, and privacy as contextual integrity. Privacy understood as the ability of individuals to 
control information about themselves is, however, the operative definition at work in the vast 
majority of U.S. policy discussions. Therefore, despite its conceptual and practical shortcomings, 
it is the definition I assume for the sake of argument here. For a helpful discussion of various 
approaches, see Chapter 4 in Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context.
 6. Gellman, 6–8.
 7. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, European Court of Human Rights, and 
Council of Europe.
 8. Cate, 350.
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and private sector data collection, but only with respect to certain specific 
kinds of data.
When it comes to the vast majority of commercial data collection in the 
United States, privacy guidelines are, as Robert Gellman writes, “mostly 
voluntary and sporadic.”9 As there is no single, overarching data privacy 
law, the main way the government pushes private firms to comply with 
privacy principles is through the threat of Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) enforcement actions. Businesses are encouraged to issue privacy 
policies, which describe—often in excruciating detail—what information 
they collect about their users and how they intend to use it. And through 
its authority to prosecute “unfair and deceptive” trade practices, the FTC 
then ensures that those businesses keep to their word.10
In 2000, the FTC issued a report outlining its own version of the FIPPs, 
which it offered as guidance for designing commercial privacy policies. 
Unlike the HEW report FIPPs, which included a mixture of substantive 
and procedural norms, the FTC’s recommendations drop the substantive 
concerns about data reliability and purpose specificity and focus almost 
entirely on procedural guidelines for ensuring user control.11 The FTC 
recommends that private businesses collecting user information offer
1. Notice—Websites would be required to provide consumers clear and 
conspicuous notice of their information practices, including what 
information they collect, how they collect it (e.g., directly or through 
nonobvious means such as cookies), how they use it, how they provide 
choice, access, and security to consumers, whether they disclose the 
information collected to other entities, and whether other entities are 
collecting information through the site.
2. Choice—Websites would be required to offer consumers choices as to 
how their personal identifying information is used beyond the use for 
which the information was provided (e.g., to consummate a transac-
tion). Such choice would encompass both internal secondary uses (such 
as marketing back to consumers) and external secondary uses (such as 
disclosing data to other entities).
3. Access—Websites would be required to offer consumers reason-
able access to the information a website has collected about them, 
 9. Gellman, 20.
 10. Cate, “The Failure of Fair Information,” 352.
 11. Ibid.
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including a reasonable opportunity to review information and to  correct 
 inaccuracies or delete information.
4. Security—Websites would be required to take reasonable steps to 
protect the security of the information they collect from consumers.12
In other words, businesses can do what they want with user informa-
tion, provided (1) they tell users that they are going to do it and (2) users 
choose to proceed.13 This is the notice-and-consent model.
It’s worth pausing for a moment to note that in the FTC framework 
(and related guidelines) notice (1) and consent (or “choice”) (2) are offered 
as two independent principles. Notice ensures that users are aware of a 
firm’s data practices; consent ensures that they are only implicated in those 
practices if they want to be. This is important, because, as we will see, 
critics of notice-and-consent tend to treat them as a single norm.
There are many things to like about the FTC’s emphasis on procedural 
rather than substantive regulations. First, as both admirers and critics 
point out, notice-and-consent reflects a free-market approach to privacy: 
almost any behavior is permitted as long as all of the parties contractually 
agree to it.14 The role of government, in this model, is merely to ensure 
that the contracts are enforced. From the perspective of businesses, this 
allows for a kind of flexibility that (it is claimed) is essential to commercial 
competitiveness.15 The real value of user information is often discovered 
only after it’s collected. Requiring companies to use information solely 
for purposes specified in advance could plausibly hamper their ability to 
innovate. Likewise, from the perspective of users, notice-and-consent is 
designed to be responsive to their preferences. Some users care more about 
who has information about them than others, and the notice-and-consent 
approach gives individuals the opportunity to express their desires and 
 12. U.S. Federal Trade Commission, 36–37. The FTC first issued privacy guidelines in 1998, 
which included notice/awareness, choice/consent, access/participation, integrity/security, and 
enforcement/redress. It updated its recommendations in 2000, dropping the “enforcement/
redress” principle. See Gellman, 20–21. As Gellman notes, since 2000 the FTC has issued incon-
sistent guidelines regarding the FIPPs (Ibid., 21).
 13. As in this footnote, access and security are, for the FTC, second in importance to notice-
and-consent. As Reidenberg et al., write: “The FTC has identified notice as ‘[t]he most funda-
mental principle’ in online privacy” (citing the FTC’s 2000 Report).
 14. As Solove writes, “Consent legitimizes nearly any form of collection, use, or disclosure of 
personal data” (1880). Also see Nissenbaum on “the compatibility of notice-and-consent with the 
paradigm of a competitive free market” (“A Contextual Approach,” 34).
 15. “Lawmakers and officials in the United States have refrained from heavy-handed restric-
tions on the flow of information out of a fear of stifling innovation—a fear shared by academics” 
(Calo, 1048).
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interests. If they want to, it allows people to sell their personal informa-
tion or to exchange it for services. While at the same time, it is meant (in 
theory) to protect those who would rather not have information collected 
about them from having it collected against their will.
Furthermore, from the FTC’s perspective, notice-and-consent is easy 
to implement and cheap to enforce.16 Rather than regulators having to 
determine which data practices are acceptable and which are not, in which 
contexts and under what circumstances, and to keep up with social and 
technological developments that might alter those determinations, the 
notice-and-consent approach allows the FTC simply to verify that com-
mercial organizations are complying with the terms the organizations 
themselves specify. Instead of having to do the difficult normative work of 
deciding whether or not particular data practices are ethically and politi-
cally legitimate, regulators need only look to see if users have agreed to the 
terms of an organization’s privacy policy. If they have, then the practices 
described in the policy are considered prima facie acceptable.
As an overarching regulatory scheme, notice-and-consent thus offers 
something for everyone. In theory, businesses, their customers, and the 
regulators overseeing them, all benefit in some way from an approach that 
restricts itself to procedural concerns. Nevertheless, notice-and-consent 
has come under sustained criticism. While good for businesses, notice-
and-consent fails to deliver for consumers. Philosophers and legal theorists 
argue that for a variety of reasons it offers not choice, but merely the illu-
sion of choice. It claims to be responsive to user preferences and interests, 
but in fact serves to obscure the actual conditions under which user infor-
mation is collected, stored, transmitted, and used. If the normative core 
of notice-and-consent is its promise to give users control over information 
about themselves, critics of notice-and-consent argue that it fails to live up 
to that promise.
They level five main criticisms. First, they argue that notice-and- consent 
fails to offer real options for consumers to choose from. The decision is 
typically all-or-nothing: accept the terms and conditions set forth in the 
terms of service (TOS) or end-user license agreement (EULA) or do not 
engage with the product or service at all. And the latter is often not a real-
istic option, since the cost of opting out is often too high. If, for instance, 
the choice is between accepting a social network’s privacy policy and get-
ting to see pictures of one’s grandchildren, or rejecting the policy’s terms 
 16. Ben-Shahar and Schneider, “The Failure of Mandated Disclosure,” 103.
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and not getting to see them, many grandparents will not view the latter as 
an acceptable option. As Helen Nissenbaum puts it: “While it may seem 
that individuals freely choose to pay the informational price, the price of 
not engaging socially, commercially, and financially may in fact be exacting 
enough to call into question how freely these choices are made.”17
Second, critics argue that even when a company provides users with 
real options, they are often ill-equipped to understand and evaluate them. 
Most people do not read privacy notices.18 Those who do are confronted 
with  notoriously long, technical contracts rendered in dense legalese.19 If 
the reader is trained to decode the legal jargon, they will still need a great 
deal of technical background knowledge to make sense of the content. 
Furthermore, as Solove argues, even if the average user could understand the 
average privacy policy they would face a variety of common decision- making 
problems.20 Bounded rationality issues, such as availability heuristics and 
framing effects, make it exceedingly difficult for individuals to weigh the 
costs of particular data practices against their own privacy interests.21 “The 
situation nearly approaches that faced by the protagonist in Franz Kafka’s 
parable Before the Law,” Solove writes, “where the gateway was guarded by 
an infinite set of doorkeepers, each more powerful than the next.”22
Importantly, the firms presenting users with these options do not face 
the same problem. Which is to say, significant information asymmetries 
exist between users and the organizations with which they are contracting. 
While—for the reasons described earlier—users will generally have diffi-
culty evaluating the costs and benefits of particular data practices, firms 
will not. As Chris Hoofnagle and Jan Whittington write, “the firm is aware 
of its cost structure, technically savvy, often motivated by high-powered 
incentives of stock values, and adept at structuring the deal so that more 
financially valuable assets are procured from consumers than consumers 
would prefer.”23 This asymmetry introduces questions about the relative 
power of these different parties and whether the terms they reach are fair.24
 17. Nissenbaum, “A Contextual Approach,” 35.
 18. Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context, 105. Citing Kandra and Brandt.
 19. Ben-Shahar and Schneider, “The Failure of Mandated Disclosure.”
 20. Solove.
 21. Hanna.
 22. Solove.
 23. Hoofnagle and Whittington, 640–41, quoted in Hull.
 24. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for emphasizing this point.
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The third problem is that notice-and-consent simply does not scale. 
Most of us engage with a huge number of information actors— commercial 
websites and apps, government agencies, educational institutions, and so 
on. While we might be expected to read, understand, and evaluate a few 
of their privacy policies, it is inconceivable that we could keep up with 
them all.25 Furthermore, as Nissenbaum points out, the arrangement of 
 information actors working behind the scenes is a “shifting landscape.” The 
entity directly collecting information about us might store it on servers 
elsewhere, pass it along to others for further processing, or sell it. “The tech-
nical and institutional story is so complicated,” Nissenbaum argues, “that 
probably only a handful of deep experts would be able to piece together a 
full account [. . .] Even if, for a given moment, a snapshot of the informa-
tion flows could be grasped, the realm is in constant flux, with new firms 
entering the picture, new analytics, and new back-end contracts forged.”26
If the huge number of information actors we deal with is a problem, 
then the huge amount of information itself is an even bigger one. The 
fourth criticism of notice-and-consent is what Solove describes as “the 
problem of aggregation.” Things about us which do not seem particularly 
sensitive can, in the aggregate, reveal deeply personal information. Which 
is to say, the sum of data about us is greater than its parts. When individ-
uals weigh the costs and benefits of disclosing particular pieces of infor-
mation, they can’t know what other information it will be combined with 
down the road. Notice-and-consent thus demands that we make onetime 
decisions that can have cascading effects, and we are in principle unable to 
predict those effects at the moment of decision.27
Fifth and finally, critics of notice-and-consent point out that the 
interests privacy protects are not only individual interests, but social or 
collective interests too. Priscilla Regan and Joel Reidenberg both argue, for 
instance, that privacy has social benefits.28 Julie Cohen argues that privacy 
is necessary for individual creativity and innovation, which in turn are 
 25. In 2008, McDonald and Cranor estimated that it would take the average person 244 
hours per year (or 40 minutes per day) to read all the relevant privacy policies they encountered 
online. That estimate does not gauge how long it would take to comprehend the policies—just to 
read the texts. Mcdonald and Cranor, 26.
 26. Nissenbaum, “A Contextual Approach,” 35. See also Barocas and Nissenbaum, 7.
 27. For a helpful discussion of this problem see Nissenbaum, “Toward an Approach to 
Privacy in Public.”
 28. Regan; Reidenberg.
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necessary for ethical and cultural development.29 Lior Strahilevitz draws 
attention to the distributive effects of different privacy regimes.30 And for 
Nissenbaum, privacy is—in the first place—a set of social norms, not a set 
of individual decisions. Privacy norms “preserve the integrity of the social 
contexts in which we live our lives, and they support and promote the 
ends, purposes, and values around which these contexts are oriented.”31 On 
the notice-and-consent model of privacy regulation individuals are made 
to decide about the fate of social goods.
To summarize, then, the main arguments against notice-and-consent are
1. It offers only all-or-nothing decisions, and the cost of opting out is 
often too high to represent a meaningful choice.
2. Privacy policies are too difficult to understand, and widespread cogni-
tive problems make individuals bad at weighing the costs and benefits 
of particular data practices.
3. Notice-and-consent doesn’t scale—there are too many information 
actors to keep up with, and they constitute a constantly shifting 
landscape.
4. Data aggregation makes it difficult, if not impossible, to know in 
advance how revealing particular pieces of information are.
5. Privacy protects both individual and social interests, and individuals 
ought not to be in the position of deciding whether or not to safeguard 
social goods.
Arguments 2–4 can be described together in broader terms: individ-
uals are ill-equipped to make the kinds of decisions notice-and-consent 
requires them to make. So the five criticisms earlier can really be described 
as three:
1. Notice-and-consent fails to offer real choices.
2–4. What choices it offers we are ill-equipped to make.
5. It asks us to make choices that shouldn’t be ours to make.
For these reasons, privacy scholars argue that we ought to move away 
from strictly procedural privacy regulations and toward more substantive 
controls. Nissenbaum and Solon Barocas “support substantive direct regu-
lation.”32 Solove calls for “more substantive rules about data  collection, use, 
 29. Cohen.
 30. Strahilevitz, 33.
 31. Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context, 186.
 32. Barocas and Nissenbaum.
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and disclosure,” with “hard boundaries that block  particularly  troublesome 
practices as well as softer default rules that can be bargained around.”33 
Joel Reidenberg and his colleagues at the Fordham Center on Law and 
Information Policy suggest that notice-and-consent is effective at protect-
ing against some privacy-related harms (unauthorized disclosures, surrep-
titious collection), but not others (data security, wrongful retention), and 
regulators ought to rely on it to do only as much work as it’s able.34 None 
of these critics argues that notice-and-consent ought to be abandoned 
entirely, but their arguments suggest that it does not have a significant role 
to play in any truly privacy-protective future.35
I find these arguments persuasive. Notice-and-consent appears to be a 
failed regulatory model. Normatively, it was designed to give users control 
over information about themselves, but it manages only the semblance 
of control. For all of the reasons described earlier, when users agree to 
the terms of commercial privacy policies, there is little reason to believe 
they are expressing real preferences. Their consent reflects resignation not 
deliberation. Assuming, then, that consent has failed, and it ought to be 
abandoned, should notice be abandoned too?
Decoupling Notice and Consent
Implicit in the critiques discussed earlier is a theory of the relationship 
between notice and consent. On this theory, consent is the normatively 
salient term. It is the mark, the imprimatur, of respect for individual 
preferences. If notice-and-consent offers a procedural form of privacy, then 
consent is—both literally and figuratively—the end of the procedure.
Notice, on the other hand, is simply a means to that end. In order for 
consent to be meaningful, it must be informed. To treat the signature at 
the end of a privacy policy (or the “I Agree” clicked at the bottom of a 
screen) as a real testament of the user’s will, we have to assume that the 
user understood the decision being made. Were they ignorant or deceived 
their consent might not reflect their true preferences. The point of notice 
is to facilitate that understanding; it’s meant to provide the information 
 33. Solove, 1903.
 34. Reidenberg et al., 29.
 35. For additional recommendations that we move away from purely procedural privacy 
regulations and toward more substantive controls, see Cate.
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users need to make free, reasoned decisions. As Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl 
Schneider write: “mandated disclosure [i.e., notice] addresses the problem 
of a world in which nonspecialists must make choices requiring specialist 
knowledge. Its solution is alluringly simple: if people face unfamiliar and 
complex decisions, give them information until the decision is familiar 
and comprehensible.”36
The arguments discussed in the previous section demonstrate that 
privacy disclosures fail to fulfill this function. They are too difficult to 
understand. There are too many to keep up with. They describe only the 
near-term effects of disclosing information about ourselves; what that 
information will reveal once aggregated is unknowable in advance. As such, 
the consent offered when individuals sign privacy policies, click through 
clickwrap agreements, or agree to long, unreadable TOS contracts, is not 
meaningful consent. It does not represent careful, deliberate, and informed 
decision-making, but rather a pro forma gesture. And such gestures cannot 
legitimate the collection and use of user information.
Understood in this context, the rationale for throwing out notice along 
with consent is as follows: What we care about is consent. In order for 
 consent to legitimate certain behaviors and practices, the consenter must 
have a certain threshold level of knowledge or understanding about the 
decision he or she faces. Notice is meant to help provide that understand-
ing, but it fails to do so. Consequently, consent fails to do the work we need 
it to do. Absent consent, there is no job for notice. Or to put it another 
way, critics of notice-and-consent assume that consent is the crucial bit, 
and notice is valuable only because (in theory) it makes informed consent 
possible. Thus, having shown that consent fails to further the normative 
aims we look to it for—to make policy deferential to individual preferences 
and interests—they assume to have undermined the case for notice too.
But what if notice fulfills—or could fulfill—other functions? That it 
fails to provide the level of understanding required to make informed 
consent decisions does not mean it fails to provide any understanding at 
all. Indeed, the degree of understanding required for informed consent is 
extremely high. When we make informed consent decisions, we usually 
waive some of our rights. (Notice-and-consent might more accurately be 
called “notice-and-waiver,” its point being less to give users meaningful 
agency in navigating the informational landscape and more to shield the 
government and private firms from liability around their data practices.) 
 36. Ben-Shahar and Schneider, More Than You Wanted to Know, 5.
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We take on the entire burden of responsibility for the outcomes of the set 
of actions we consent to. In order to offer that kind of consent, we need 
to have a deep and complex picture of the choice we are making.37 Yet for 
lots of other important things we might do or want to do, a lesser degree 
of understanding might suffice. To say that notice doesn’t provide enough 
meaningful information to meet the very highest bar is not to say the 
information it does provide isn’t valuable at all.
One reason this possibility has not been given due consideration likely 
stems from the particular conception of the subject that proponents of 
notice-and-choice imagine to be its beneficiary. As Julie Cohen argues that 
conception is inherited from traditional liberal political theory and under-
stands subjects as “rational choosers.”38 These are the idealized protagonists 
of rational choice theory, who decide how to act by gathering informa-
tion and using it to evaluate the expected utility of their options. Cohen 
describes the rational chooser as a “definitionally autonomous being who 
experiences unbroken continuity between preference and action.”39 Since 
the chief normative commitment that liberal political theory aims to real-
ize is respect for individual preferences, and since the rational chooser is 
understood as being able to signal their preferences unproblematically via 
consent decisions, operationalizing liberal theory’s normative commitment 
appears to be fairly straightforward: just ask individuals whether or not 
they consent to different forms of treatment. In the case of information 
privacy, this means asking them whether or not they consent to particular 
information practices.
Given these background assumptions, it is no wonder that the value 
of the notice-and-consent regime has traditionally been understood to 
revolve around the consent part. If user consent decisions are not worth 
anything, surely the disclosures meant to prepare users to make them 
 37. The idea of informed consent was originally developed in the field of bioethics. Describing 
its demands, bioethicist Beauchamp writes that informed consent is legitimate “if and only if the 
person, with substantial understanding and in substantial absence of control by others, intention-
ally authorizes a health professional to do something” (517–18, emphasis mine).
 38. Cohen, 110–15. In fact, Cohen argues that American privacy law is disjointed, imagining 
two incompatible beneficiaries of its protections. Constitutional law, on the one hand, under-
stands the subject as a “romantic dissenter” who values privacy because it protects their ability to 
dissent from prevailing public opinion and express unpopular views. Information privacy law, on 
the other hand, is the domain of the “rational chooser,” who treats privacy as only instrumentally 
valuable, and therefore something one can (and should) trade for other goods. The notice-and-
consent framework is a product of the latter.
 39. Ibid., 112
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are not worth anything either. As Cohen and many others have argued, 
however, the liberal conception of the subject and its attendant notion of 
autonomy are not the only game in town.40 A deeper account, which truly 
reflected respect for persons (and their ability to choose), would acknowl-
edge that we are imperfect decision-makers, bounded by a variety of 
limitations. While it is true that under such imperfect conditions, the kind 
of consent decision notice-and-consent asks users to make is little more 
than lip service (and legal cover for the data holder), providing users with 
disclosure information anyway can strengthen their decisions, even though 
they remain imperfect ones.
Indeed, one of the most prominent (and liberal) accounts of autonomy— 
that offered by Joseph Raz—understands autonomous decision-makers in 
just this way. As Raz writes, “The autonomous person is a (part) author of 
his own life. The ideal of autonomy is the vision of people controlling, to 
some degree, their own destiny, fashioning it through successive decisions 
throughout their lives.”41 For Raz, we are part authors of our own lives, 
rather than full authors, because we are shaped by a variety of forces, from 
the nature of our upbringings to the social contexts in which we make 
important life decisions. Nevertheless, we are able to act autonomously 
because we are able, more or less, to “make [our] own lives.”42 That means 
having an adequate variety of options and being free from coercion or 
manipulation when choosing from amongst them, but it does not require 
having perfect information about the choices we confront. “To choose one 
must be aware of one’s options,” Raz argues, “[. . . One] must be capable 
of understanding how various choices will have considerable and lasting 
impact on his life.”43 Legalistic attempts to solicit an individual’s consent 
are not, on this account, demonstrations of respect for individual auton-
omy. To respect autonomy, understood in this way, one would attempt 
to help people understand their options, as best they can, so that they 
can identify with and endorse their choices once they are made. In 
the next section, I offer some examples of how disclosures can do this 
 important-if-imperfect work.
Before moving on, it is also worth pointing out that calls to move away 
from notice-and-consent come at a particularly inopportune moment—a 
 40. See, for example, Christman; Mackenzie and Stoljar.
 41. Raz, 369.
 42. Ibid.
 43. Ibid., 371.
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moment in which the average person’s awareness of how they are impli-
cated in everyday data practices is likely decreasing.44 The trend in tech-
nology development is toward streamlining the user experience such that 
none of the underlying hardware and software processes are visible to the 
user.45 In terms of user experience that is probably to the good, but when 
it comes to privacy, it isn’t. It means that people will continue to have little 
idea about what information is being collected about them, by whom, or 
for what purposes.46 And this will be happening at the same time as the 
amount of data collected about them, and the number of parties collecting 
it, continues to grow.
Calls to sideline notice-and-consent thus come precisely when we need 
notice most. While it’s clear that we cannot rely on it to provide the level 
of understanding required for individuals to take on the full burden of 
responsibility for evaluating commercial data practices, it might help keep 
us from being cast totally into the dark. Quasi-informed citizen- consumers 
are preferable to mostly ignorant ones. What’s more, if notice and consent 
are no longer paired, if consent is no longer the normative end to which 
notice aspires, then perhaps notice can take new forms. Perhaps we could 
simplify notice, or make it more “visceral.” Arguments against this kind 
of simplification have traditionally assumed that the goal is consumer 
consent. Having shifted notice’s purpose, such arguments lose their force.47
I propose, then, that we relax the standards placed on notice and see if it 
might do any good for us. Let us imagine that we have followed the advice 
of notice’s critics and moved toward more substantive regulation, and let 
us see if there are roles for notice to play still.
 44. Acquisti, Brandimarte, and Loewenstein argue, for example, that “Advancements in 
information technology have made the collection and usage of personal data often invisible. As 
a result, individuals rarely have clear knowledge of what information other people, firms, and 
governments have about them or how that information is used and with what consequences.”
 45. See Norman.
 46. Cohen calls this a lack of “operational transparency” (234–39).
 47. In their “definitive work” on the failures of mandated disclosure regimes, for instance, 
Ben-Shahar and Schneider write, “Whether mandated disclosure works depends on its goals,” 
and they canvas existing regulatory structures to demonstrate, forcefully, that its goal—in U.S. 
law—has always been to equip consumers to make informed decisions (More than You Wanted 
to Know, 34.) When they argue against simplification (Chapter 8), this remains the background 
assumption. They do not entertain the possibility that the goal of mandated disclosure regulation 
could be changed.
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The Virtues of Notice
Imagine we have done what notice-and-consent’s critics would have 
us do (and I agree we should do). We put in place a set of substantive 
privacy regulations—“hard boundaries that block particularly troublesome 
practices as well as softer default rules that can be bargained around,” as 
Solove suggests.48 As with food safety regulations, these “hard boundaries” 
around data practices would protect us from clear, obvious harms. They 
would allow us to operate on the assumption that the information actors 
we transact with cannot simply do anything they want with the sensitive 
information about us they collect—an assumption we cannot operate on 
at present. With such protections in place individuals would be reasonably 
assured that making data about themselves available to organizations and 
private firms is fundamentally safe, even without any vigilance on their 
part. Beyond that protective floor, however, there would remain a vast 
realm of data practices about which people would continue to disagree.
The question then is: what work could notice do in this world? What 
value is there in mandated privacy disclosures once minimal substantive 
regulations are in place? In what remains, I discuss a number of plausible 
answers to these questions, which I group broadly into two categories: 
notice’s direct and indirect benefits. First, I describe roles notice could play 
directly in support of user decision-making at the individual level, by mak-
ing individuals aware of salient features of the informational landscape. 
Second, I point to the work notice can do to support users indirectly, either 
by empowering other parties who advocate for users, or by encouraging 
those who build data-driven tools to do so with user interests in mind. 
Importantly, this is not intended as an exhaustive list. It is simply a start-
ing point, a proof-of-concept that will hopefully serve as motivation to 
think more actively about the positive work notice can do in a world after 
notice-and-consent.
The Direct Benefits of Notice
As I argued in the previous section, critics of notice-and-consent are right 
to charge that privacy disclosures are insufficient instruments for providing 
individual users with a deep enough understanding of the informational 
practices they are implicated in to facilitate consent decisions related to 
 48. Solove, 1903.
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those practices that meaningfully reflect user choice. Having taken consent 
out of the picture, however, and having thus lowered the epistemic bar 
for the kind of understanding we expect notice to enable, we are now in a 
position to constructively ask what of value users might learn from privacy 
notices.
One purpose notice could serve is providing basic situational awareness. 
Lost amidst the “complex and shifting landscape” of information actors 
that Nissenbaum warns us about, it is difficult for the average end user 
(indeed, it is difficult even for the expert) to figure out who is collecting 
information about them, when, and for what purposes.49 Even if substan-
tive privacy regulations assured us that interacting with these information 
actors was safe, we still might want to know who has information about us 
and what they are doing with it. As we’ve seen, privacy disclosures rarely 
provide sufficient understanding to enable individual control over those 
actors, but notices might nevertheless meet a lower bar. Websites or apps 
could warn users if the information they collect will be sent to a third party 
for processing, if it will be aggregated with other user information, or if it 
will be sold.
That information could, in turn, help individuals flag prima facie 
 privacy problems. For example, most of the time it wouldn’t surprise us 
to learn that the websites we use transmit information about us to third 
 parties for processing. If we learned, though, that a cloud storage service 
like Dropbox or Google Drive did that it might give us pause. Since many 
people store sensitive documents in cloud storage, they might want to 
know where exactly those documents were being sent, for what purposes, 
what security measures protected them, and what legal obligations those 
third parties owed them. We are better equipped to spot potential issues 
if we’re armed with even some information about the data practices impli-
cating us. And once we are aware of such issues, we can press for more 
information, enlist the help of experts (discussed further in the following), 
and so on.
Second, notice can equip us with the information needed to protect our 
privacy through nonlegal means. This is related to the idea of providing 
situational awareness, but is more directed. For some people, knowing that 
basic substantive privacy protections are in place will be enough to put to 
rest all their privacy worries. If they don’t place a high personal premium 
on their privacy, then knowing that minimal safeguards exist to protect 
 49. Nissenbaum, “A Contextual Approach,” 36.
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them from plainly harmful practices could be all the peace of mind they 
need. But other people will want more. Political dissidents or activists, or 
people who work with sensitive trade secrets, for example, might want a 
higher level of privacy around their personal information than regulation 
will provide.
In order to secure that added privacy, privacy-demanding users might 
look beyond the law. They could choose to withhold certain information. 
They could look to engineering solutions, such as “privacy-enhancing 
technologies” (PETs).50 Or, as Nissenbaum and Finn Brunton suggest, 
they could engage in obfuscation—“the production of misleading, ambig-
uous and plausible but confusing information as an act of concealment 
or evasion.”51 For Nissenbaum and Brunton, obfuscation is a toolkit for 
protecting one’s privacy that individuals can look to precisely when they 
have reason to believe legal protections are insufficient. It is “an  alternative 
strategy of informational self-defense, a method that acts as informa-
tional resistance, disobedience, protest or even covert sabotage.”52 Yet in 
order to engage in any of these forms of self-directed, extralegal, privacy- 
protective behaviors, individuals need to have at least a rough sense of 
the  informational landscape they’re operating in. Engaging in effective 
obfuscation, for example, requires knowing when and where and what 
to obscure. While notice can’t provide the level of awareness informed 
consent demands, it could facilitate a level of awareness that is useful for 
achieving these other goals.
Third, notice can alert us to the fact that we need to assert other rights. 
Recent discussions about digital due process rights, for instance, demand 
that individuals know when they are in a situation in which those rights 
should be exercised. Danielle Citron argues that one way the automation 
of administrative decision-making processes—such as when to terminate 
Medicaid or other welfare benefits—deprives people of due process is that 
it deprives them of notice that decisions are being made about them, and 
of rationales explaining how they arrive at the decisions they do.53 This 
problem is only exacerbated by Big Data. Building on Citron’s work, Kate 
Crawford and Jason Schultz argue that we ought to require “those who 
use Big Data to ‘adjudicate’ others—i.e., those who make categorical or 
 50. For an overview of such approaches, see Gürses and del Alamo.
 51. Brunton and Nissenbaum, “Political and Ethical Perspectives,” 164.
 52. Ibid.; see also Brunton and Nissenbaum, Obfuscation.
 53. Citron, 1305.
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attributive determinations—to post some form of notice, disclosing not 
only the type of predictions they attempt, but also the general sources 
of data that they draw upon as inputs, including a means whereby those 
whose personal data is included can learn of that fact.”54
The Indirect Benefits of Notice
In addition to directly raising user awareness in the ways described earlier, 
notice can play an indirect role in supporting user interests. Notice can 
empower third parties that advocate on behalf of users, and the process 
of creating privacy notices can serve as a prompt to firms building data-
driven technologies to reflect on and improve user privacy.
Thus far in this discussion, I have implicitly understood individual end 
users to be the primary audience for privacy disclosures. When notice is 
attached to consent procedures, that assumption is warranted, since it is 
individual end users whose consent is being solicited. If notice was decou-
pled from consent, however, the audience could change. Beyond raising 
individual user awareness about the data practices implicating them (in 
admittedly imperfect, epistemically nonideal ways), notice could provide 
valuable information to regulators or to third parties that advocate for 
users’ interests. There are a large number of nongovernmental and other 
civil society organizations that work to strengthen privacy protections in a 
variety of ways—from educating individuals and litigating on their behalf 
to crafting and promoting policy.55 Such organizations, staffed by lawyers, 
technologists, and privacy experts, are not bound by the same limitations 
as individuals confronting long, technical disclosures rendered in opaque 
legalese. With individual consent no longer the motivation behind and 
purpose for disclosures, we could imagine their value being mediated 
through third-party privacy advocates. What’s more, such organizations 
are better positioned to help realize privacy’s social—in addition to its 
individual—importance.56 Organizations such as the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation (EFF) and the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) 
spend considerable time and effort filing Freedom of Information Act 
requests to force government agencies to disclose information about data 
 54. Crawford and Schultz, 125.
 55. See Bennett.
 56. See section, “The Rise and Fall of Notice-and-Consent.”
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collection and other surveillance practices.57 Absent mandated  disclosure 
requirements, there are few comparable avenues for gaining access to 
 information about the practices of private firms.58
Furthermore, notice can encourage good corporate behavior. Which is 
to say, beyond the value of the information itself (either to  individuals 
or third parties), there is reason to believe that simply forcing companies 
to express what they intend to do with user information—whether 
 publicly or internally to their own organization—can help induce them 
to come into compliance with social norms. A case study of this effect can 
be found in Peter Swire’s analysis of corporate responses to the financial 
privacy regulations introduced by the 1999 Graham–Leach–Bliley (GLB) 
Act. One requirement of the law is that financial organizations are required 
to provide consumers with annual disclosures about their privacy policies. 
Despite the fact that—like the privacy notices discussed earlier—GLB 
notices are usually rendered in dense, complex legalese, Swire found that 
“in order to draft the notice, many financial institutions undertook an 
extensive process, often for the first time, to learn just how data is and is 
not shared between different parts of the organization and with third par-
ties.”59 And he concluded that “many institutions discovered practices that 
they decided, upon deliberation, to change.”60 Similarly, Paula Bruening 
and Mary Culnan argue that “While not originally envisioned to function 
in this way, the drafting of a privacy notice provides a company with an 
opportunity to inventory and assess internal practices, making sure they 
are up to date, necessary, and appropriate. It can also serve as a platform 
for decision-making about whether to continue with a data practice or 
deployment of technology in light of considerations related to brand, and 
developments in law, policy, or market practices.”61
Notice Unchained
While it’s true, then, that privacy disclosures can’t facilitate the level of 
understanding required for informed consent, the level of understanding 
 57. See https://www.eff.org/issues/transparency/foia-requests and https://www.epic.org/foia/.
 58. Describing financial disclosures, Admati and Pfleiderer write: “Full voluntary disclosure, 
however, rarely seems to occur in reality, and firms typically do not disclose more than regulation 
requires,” 480.
 59. Swire, 1316 cited in Solove, fn. 85.
 60. Ibid.
 61. Bruening and Culnan, 542.
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they can facilitate is still valuable for other reasons. There is plenty of work 
for notice to do in a world after notice-and-consent.
What’s more, given these new purposes or ends toward which notice 
might be oriented, we should wonder whether it still needs to take on 
the form of the long, legal contract. After all, notice took that form in 
the first place in order to meet the high informational demands required 
for informed consent. As we’ve seen, consent decisions require deep and 
robust knowledge of what is at stake; the only way to facilitate that kind 
of understanding—to ensure that users could, in principle, consider the 
question from every angle—is to be exhaustive. Firms (or more precisely, 
their lawyers) therefore go to literal great lengths to describe every eventu-
ality that might befall one’s data. The threat of liability means companies 
cannot afford to hold anything back.
But if informed consent is no longer the goal, if deep, robust 
 understanding is no longer the epistemological standard to which privacy 
disclosures are held, and if commercial firms are no longer legally responsi-
ble for facilitating that level of user understanding, maybe privacy policies 
won’t need to be so exhaustive. Perhaps we could develop new “visceral” 
forms of notice, as Ryan Calo has suggested, and leverage auditory and 
other user experience cues to enhance user awareness, rather than rely 
solely on written disclosures.62 Or perhaps notices could be standardized 
and simplified on the model of food nutrition labels.63 Or we could require 
companies to disclose that they have significantly changed their privacy 
commitments by somehow altering their visible brand.64 Schaub et al. 
point to a variety of considerations that ought to be taken into account 
when deciding how to structure an effective privacy disclosure, ranging 
from the timing of the notice to its audience and modality.65
In general, firms could start paying attention to both the content of 
their privacy policies and the design of the notices that convey them. 
As Ari Ezra Waldman argues, we are embodied decision-makers who 
rely on a wide range of visual and organizational cues in order to pro-
cess and interpret information, and design choices therefore deeply 
influence our capacity to understand documents like privacy policies. In 
order to ensure that such policies are constructed in a way that users can 
 62. Ibid.
 63. Ciocchetti; Cranor.
 64. Ohm.
 65. Schaub, Balebako, and Cranor.
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actually comprehend them, Waldman suggests that disclosure designs be 
 empirically tested before being implemented.66 Skepticism toward efforts 
such as these—to reengineer disclosures in a way that makes them more 
useful to  decision-makers—is usually rooted in the assumption that the 
sole purpose of notice is to furnish the information necessary to make 
informed consent decisions.67 Were notice to be decoupled from consent 
and made to serve other  purposes, such skepticism would lack warrant. If 
facilitating consent is no longer the function of notice, we can imagine its 
form changing too.68
Conclusion
Finally, two caveats. Privacy disclosures aren’t without a downside. As 
Chris Hoofnagle and Jennifer King have pointed out, some users misinter-
pret the sheer presence of privacy policies as an indication that the websites 
or apps displaying them adhere to privacy-protective standards.69 It is easy 
to imagine commercial firms leveraging this misunderstanding for their 
own gain. One reason why privacy advocates have worked to marginalize 
the role of notice-and-consent in the overall scheme of privacy regulation 
is that it requires users to shoulder more responsibility for vetting the data 
practices they encounter than they reasonably ought to shoulder. By trying 
to bring disclosure back into the picture I thus risk inadvertently giving 
already powerful actors—corporations, and other private and public orga-
nizations and institutions—normative cover.
If we are careful, though, these legitimate worries can be avoided. 
Spared from having to be exhaustive, privacy notices could be designed 
to truly facilitate user understanding, rather than to shield information 
actors from legal liability. If they are successful, users will be less likely to 
 66. Waldman.
 67. See, for example, Ben-Shahar and Schneider, More Than You Wanted to Know, Part III.
 68. Of course, this raises the question of how to define the legal standards by which these 
new forms of disclosure would be judged. Answering that question is outside the scope of this 
article, but it is worth emphasizing here that even though I have described a number of different 
roles notice could play in a world after notice-and-consent, I do not mean to suggest that its role 
or roles should remain undefined. My goal has been to demonstrate that notice could have value 
beyond informing individuals to make consent decisions. If my argument is persuasive, then we 
ought to carefully specify the work we want notices to do, and we ought to craft legal standards 
that ensure they can do it.
 69. Hoofnagle and King.
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misinterpret their meaning. Likewise, once consent (or waiver) has been 
replaced, at least in certain contexts, with substantive regulation, legiti-
mating data practices will require evaluating the real risks and potential 
harms those practices carry, rather than simply evaluating compliance with 
written notices. Helping raise user awareness about the data practices they 
are implicated in should not relieve information actors of responsibility for 
not harming their users.
Critics of purely procedural privacy regulations are right to argue 
that notice-and-consent has failed to live up to its normative promises. 
Meaningful consent decisions require an extremely high level of awareness 
and understanding, and privacy disclosures cannot provide it. That users 
agree to the terms of commercial privacy policies is therefore poor evidence 
that those decisions reflect users’ true preferences and interests. We should 
do as notice-and-consent critics suggest and institute substantive privacy 
regulations.
We move too quickly, however, when we infer from those arguments 
that notice and consent ought to be marginalized in equal proportion. 
Notice is a means, a regulatory instrument, and consent is but one possible 
end it might serve. Even in a world where we are protected by some num-
ber of substantive privacy regulations, there is plenty of work for notice to 
do. Though it cannot provide the level of understanding required to make 
informed consent decisions, it can provide a lesser level of understanding 
that meaningfully strengthens user decision-making in other ways.
It is especially important that we recognize this now. Calls to move 
past privacy disclosures come at the same time as end users are implicated 
in an increasingly vast universe of information practices, which— without 
 mandated disclosure—they will have less and less information about. 
Thus, while debates about the value of consent for legitimating data prac-
tices will no doubt continue, we would do well to recognize that the value 
of notice is not contingent upon their answer.
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